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SOFTWARE ACQUISITION GOLD PRACTICE

FORMAL RISK MANAGEMENT

 

FOCUS AREA:  RISK – Risk Management

 

Definition and Summary: Software Risk Management is a proactive approach for minimizing the uncertainty and potential loss associated with a project.  A risk is an event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a project’s objectives.  The three common characteristics of risk are (1) it represents a future event, (2) it has a probability of occurring of greater than 0%, but less than 100%, and (3) the consequence of the risk must be unexpected or unplanned for.  Future events can be categorized as opportunity-focused (positive risk) if their consequences are favorable, or as threat-focused (negative risk) if their consequences are unfavorable.

“If you can’t afford to mitigate the risk now, be absolutely sure that you can afford to resolve the problem later when it happens.” [Universal, 2002]

Providing insights to support informed decision making is the primary objective of Risk Management.  In practice, Risk Management concentrates on performing bottom-up, detailed, continuous assessment of risk and opportunity.  It focuses on addressing the day-to-day operational risks that a program faces.  Risk Management follows a two-stage, repeatable and iterative process of assessment (i.e., the identification, estimation and evaluation of the risks confronting a program) and management (i.e., the planning for, monitoring of, and controlling of the means to eliminate or reduce the likelihood or consequences of the risks discovered).  It is performed continually over the life of a program, from initiation to retirement.

Effective implementation of formal risk management is based on the following set of benefits resulting from the process:

§         Appropriately tailored risk management strategies are defined and implemented

§         Potential problems (risks) that could impact project success are identified

§         The likelihood and consequences of these risks are understood

§         A priority order in which risks should be addressed is established

§         Mitigation alternatives appropriate for each potential problem are carefully considered based on project circumstances

§         Optimized mitigation techniques for all risks above their thresholds are selected

§         Contingency plans in case the risk mitigates are developed proactively, rather than as a result of fire-fighting

§         Information to improve risk management policies is captured, analyzed and acted upon

§         Risk management processes/procedures are systematically and periodically reviewed and improved to further reduce risk

 

 

DESCRIPTION OF THE PRACTICE:

 

SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

There are a variety of risks that confront the global software industry, as illustrated in the figure below.  The characteristics of the legal, social, economic and competitive environments impose constraints and opportunities that help to define the nature of the risks (and their exposure levels) for suppliers, buyers, and other stakeholders in the software acquisition and development process.

 

 

Rather than meeting risks head on, however, and despite increased efforts to promote sound risk management processes, the software industry, as a whole, tends to be in denial about whether risks exist on their programs and, if they do, how they should go about addressing them.  The figure below, adapted from the Software Program Manager’s Network (SPMN) “The Little Book of Bad Excuses” [SPMN, 1998] highlights some of the most common traps that all too many programs have fallen into over the years, and continue to fall into today.  As a result, symptoms that organizations are not effectively practicing risk management continue to flourish, including a continual state of project instability, constant fire-fighting, multiple schedule slippages because of recurring surprise factors, and constantly operating in a high-stress, crisis management environment.


(click to enlarge)
 

 

A formal risk management process is a continuous process for systematically addressing risk throughout the product/project life-cycle.  Risks can be introduced (or latently reside) at the very earliest stages of the software life-cycle.  The ability to identify risks earlier translates into earlier risk removal, at less cost, which promotes higher project success probability.

 

 

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

INTRODUCTION

Providing insights to support informed decision making is the primary objective of Risk Management.  In practice, Risk Management concentrates on performing bottom-up, detailed, continuous assessment of risk and opportunity.  It focuses on addressing the day-to-day operational risks that a program faces.  Risk Management follows a two-stage, repeatable and iterative process of assessment (i.e., the identification, estimation and evaluation of the risks confronting a program) and management (i.e., the planning for, monitoring of, and controlling of the means to eliminate or reduce the likelihood or consequences of the risks discovered).  It is performed continually over the life of a program, from initiation to retirement.

There are a variety of risks that confront the global software industry, as illustrated in Figure 1 [McManus, 2004], which will be discussed in more detail.  The characteristics of the legal, social, economic and competitive environments impose constraints and opportunities that help to define the nature of the risks (and their exposure levels) for suppliers, buyers, and other stakeholders in the software acquisition and development process.

 

Figure 1:  Risk and the Global Software Industry [McManus, 2004]

 

 

Rather than meeting them head on, however, and despite increased efforts to promote sound risk management processes, the software industry, as a whole, tends to be in denial about whether risks exist on their programs and, if they do, how they should go about addressing them.  Figure 2, adapted from the Software Program Manager’s Network (SPMN) “The Little Book of Bad Excuses” [SPMN, 1998] highlights some of the most common traps that all too many programs have fallen into over the years, and continue to fall into today.  As a result, symptoms that organizations are not effectively practicing risk management continue to flourish, including a continual state of project instability, constant fire-fighting, multiple schedule slippages because of recurring surprise factors, and constantly operating in a high-stress, crisis management environment.

 

Figure 2 (click to enlarge): 
The Stubborn Face of Risk Denial (adapted from The Little Book of Bad Excuses) [SPMN, 1998]

There are a number of good resources that helped to initially define and add rigor to software risk management approaches.  Capers Jones provided some historical perspective on the evolution of software risk assessment processes through the evolution of Software Productivity Research (SPR) activities into key process areas of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability Maturity Model (CMM).  Additional rigor was added to the software risk management approach through the contributions of Barry Boehm (“Software Risk Management” [Boehm, 1989]) and Robert N. Charette (“Software Engineering Risk Analysis and Management” [Charette, 1989] and “Application Strategies for Risk Analysis” [Charette, 1991]).

 

There are numerous reasons as to why formal risk management processes have not been implemented more widely, however, or enjoyed more success.  Some of the more interesting suggestions have been made by Kontio [Kontio, 2002], who suggests that the success of the business market (before the dot.com bubble burst) coupled with the expected rigor of a formal risk management process was felt to be, simply, not worth the investment in time or money (see Table 1).

 

Table 1:  Reasons for Lack of Progress in Software Risk Management [Kontio, 2002]

Reasons for Lack of Progress

Proposed New Agenda

The .com boom was a false perception of success:

    Companies were not concerned about risks; only opportunities.  Investors were uninterested in conservative, low-risk investments.

Business attitudes in software companies need to take both risk and opportunities into account

The wrong risk management techniques were being used:

    Simple techniques (checklists, scoring tables, complex calculation tools) deployed in 1990’s were not necessarily based on sound theories, good assumptions, or accurate mathematics.  Industry practitioners may have felt that spending time on risk management was not cost-effective.

Biased and unsound software risk management methods should be replaced by better methods

Risk management was too bureaucratic:

    Numerous report templates and standards were defined, and many lengthy reports produced, but not necessarily read or acted upon.  Therefore, risk management created high overhead cost while producing little of value.

Software risk management needs to be made cost effective and easy, while still based on sound principles

Risk management was too standard:

    Many risk management approaches/tools aimed to make their use easier by standardizing on some aspects of their models. Risks often valued only through money, calendar or effort impacts.  Similar checklists are applied to large defense contracts and small start-up companies.  Realities are much more complex than this.

Software risk management needs to be application or situation specific.  There are no “silver bullets” or “one size fits all” solutions.

Risk management was not transparent:

    Many risk management methods/tools use complex calculations and forms to document/analyze risk information.  Little attention was paid to make sure all decision-makers understood the process and results.  Since they didn’t understand them, they didn’t have confidence in them and could not communicate the results well.

Risk management methods must emphasize communication and understandability of results

Researchers were too theoretical and consultants too naïve:

    Researchers ignored practical implications or constraints.  Lack of interdisciplinary research (risk management methods not leveraged from psychologists, economists, civil engineers, etc.).  Consultants have used/reused the same old simple methods without true concern about their serious limitations.

Researchers need to provide more practice results. Consultants need to upgrade their knowledge and gain a deeper understanding of methods/tools.

 

The literature has, however, reported some success in risk management’s effect on projects.  In one study conducted by the Project Management Institute (PMI) [Voetsch, 2004], the underlying rationale was to gain an appreciation of the role of risk in relation to other project management success factors.  In order to accomplish this, the study used a population with a demonstrated sensitivity to risk, namely PMI’s Risk Special Interest Group.  Based on the 187 responses received during the winter of 2002-2003, the research showed that risk management success followed when adequate support and resources were applied to implement it.  Specifically, conclusions were drawn that:

 

·          Senior management’s sensitivity to risk increases the frequency of risk management practices

·          Availability of adequate resources increases the use and effectiveness of risk management tools

·          More frequent use of formal risk planning practices increases the use and effectiveness of risk monitoring

·          Senior management support for up-front risk planning increases the probability of project success

 

The referenced report contains some relatively positive quantitative findings regarding the use of risk management practices, but on the negative side:

 

·          Less than 5% of respondents reported “almost always” receiving encouragement for risk-taking vs. 18% who “rarely” received such encouragement

·          Only 12% of respondents reported “almost always” receiving adequate resources for risk management, while only 7% reported that project team members “almost always” receive training in risk planning and impact analysis

·          Only 20% of respondents reported that they “almost always” used formal risk reviews, and only 8% said that they used risk audits during their projects

·          Only 21% of respondents reported that their projects are completed according to their specifications or the original Statement of Work (SOW)

·          Only 30% of respondents reported “almost always”  completing their projects on time, and only 26% reported completing them within budget

·          Only 40% of respondents reported that their projects “almost always” are received with customer satisfaction upon delivery

 

Clearly, there is significant progress that needs to be made in order to use risk management techniques effectively.

 

 

The Concept of Positive Risk

 

Although there has been considerable debate regarding the proper definition of software risk, the traditional consensus has been that risk always involves two characteristics: uncertainty and loss.  While uncertainty certainly still holds true, there is a growing perception that risk can also involve opportunity as well as loss.

 

Positive risk refers to risk that we initiate ourselves because we see a potential opportunity along with a potential for failure (the negative risk associated with “loss” of the opportunity).  There are several kinds of opportunities that can be leveraged in projects if responses to them are well-timed and prompt action is initiated [Kahkonen, 2001].  These include:

 

·          Business opportunities, e.g., product development, customer care during the project life cycle, and focused attention on high profit margin activities

·          Operational opportunities, e.g., value-added, do what is important, minimize rework

·          Systemic opportunities, which typically mean long-term savings resulting from improved safety, insurance, etc.

 

Two examples of positive risk follow [Mochal, 2002].  Example 1 is a software development project that is scheduled to take 90 days.  The customer would prefer earlier delivery, and would get more value from an earlier delivery, but understands and concurs with the 90-day development period.  Utilizing a new software-testing tool might allow delivery in 60 days, but this is the first time that your organization has used the tool (lack of expertise; learning curve required). If the tool doesn’t work out, delivery might take 110 days, rather than 90.

 

In our second example, it is estimated to take six months to complete a medium-sized software development project.  You may be able to complete the project sooner using Extreme Programming techniques, delivering the first iteration in three months, then monthly updates after that.  There is a risk, however, that new techniques will not work well, or that staff may resist the changes, causing a delay in the project.

 

Although most of the remaining discussion will focus on the traditional, negative aspects of risk, it would be beneficial to think about how the techniques of formal risk management presented here could be tailored to successfully leverage positive risk.

 

As we get further into our discussion on formal risk management processes and techniques, keep in mind that there are always trade-offs that need to be considered in terms of how much to invest in risk management versus the expected payback over the total software project life-cycle.  Figure 3 helps to illustrate this point.

 

 

 

 

Figure 3:  The Role of Risk in Software Affordability

 

This figure illustrates the concept that a relative optimum point of investment exists for deciding how much money and other resources should be applied to a formal risk management program.  Proceeding to the right on the x-axis represents decreasing risk, and CTLCC represents the total software life-cycle cost, CRR is the cost associated with investment in risk reduction activities, and COM are the total operating and maintenance costs associated with the ability to successfully reduce risk.  Starting at the origin, increasing investment in formal risk management has the impact of decreasing the project risk while simultaneously decreasing the total life-cycle cost of the software.  Beyond our optimal point, however, continuing to invest in risk reduction activities will still continue to reduce risk, but the cost of doing so will exceed the degree of improvement experienced in operating and maintenance costs.  Even though we’re reducing risk, the total life-cycle cost of the software will increase.  These are the types of decisions that must be made in determining the scope of a formal risk management program, and they influence our choices in how we choose to handle risk.  Issues regarding risk avoidance, mitigation, transferal, etc., will be discussed later, but there is no silver bullet that can guide the decision-making process.  Each project (and the needs of the business at specific points in time and under certain market conditions) will most likely require specifically tailored risk management solutions.

The Most Common/Serious Software Risks

There are numerous reasons as to why formal risk management is difficult to implement effectively.  These include the sheer number of risk factors that have been identified in the literature.  For example, Capers Jones assessed several hundred organizations and observed over 100 risk factors (of which 60 he discusses in detail in [Jones, 1994]).  He observed, however, that few projects have more than 15 active risk factors at any one time, but many projects have approximately six simultaneous risk factors.

 

Another reason for the relatively low implementation of formal risk management methods in practice are, according to [Kontio, 1998], the fact that risk is an abstract or fuzzy concept for which users lack the necessary tools to more accurately define risk for a deeper analysis.  In addition, many risk management methods may be based on risk quantification.  Users may not have the ability to provide accurate estimates for probability and loss/opportunity projections required for a reliable risk analysis.  Table-based approaches can sometimes be too biased or too coarse for proper risk prioritization.  Risks may also have different implications for different stakeholders (or, conversely, be perceived differently by different stakeholders).  Existing risk management methods may not provide support for dealing with these differences.  Risks may also affect a project in more than one way.  For example, most risk management approaches focus on cost, schedule or quality risks, but there may be combinations of risks or other characteristics such as future required maintenance, company reputation, or potential liability/litigation that should be considered important in influencing the decision-making process.  Finally, many current risk management techniques may be perceived as too costly or too complex to use.  Simple, straightforward risk management techniques that require an acceptable amount of time to produce results might be the answer.

 

So, what kinds of risks are likely to be encountered in the acquisition and development of software?

 

There are a number of sources in the literature that expound upon the different types of software risks and problems.  References and, where available, Internet links are included in the bibliography section of this document.  These references include [Jones, 1994], [Boehm, 1991], [McManus, 2004], [GAO, 2004a], [GSAM, 2000], [DAU, 2003], [STSC, 2003], [Buttigieg], [Kontio, 2002], and [Weigers, 1998].

 

Since there is a great deal of overlap between them (although some have some slightly different perspectives on potential software project risks) only a few of them will be addressed in the body of this document, primarily because the references provide some additional insight beyond just identifying the potential software program risks.  Readers should use these references as a trigger for identifying risks, causes and potential solutions that should be considered in support of their own projects.

 

Table 2 is of particular interest because of the discussions of each risk in the context of other potential related problems on the project, or in the larger organization.  It provides an interesting summary perspective on the concept of compound risks.  Jones book goes into much more detail regarding these risks. An expanded version of this table has been prepared and made available by the DACS at http://www.goldpractices.com/practices/frm/SoftwareRisks-Jones1994.doc.

 

Table 2:  The Most Serious Software Risks [Jones, 1994]

Software

Risk

Risk

Characteristics

Possible Compounding Risks

Canceled Projects

A.     Software projects that are terminated prior to delivery to their intended customers

·      Almost always associated with Friction with Users and Friction with Senior Management

·      Strong association with Low Employee Morale, Low Managerial Morale and High Staff Attrition

·      Strongly associated with Lost Business Opportunities and Low Market Shares

·      Canceled projects can be caused by Inadequate Planning, Inadequate Cost Estimating, Missed Schedules, Long Schedules, Excessive Time to Market, Cost Overruns, Inexperienced Management, Management Malpractice, Inexperienced Clients, Creeping User Requirements, Inadequate Development Processes, Low Productivity, and Low Quality

Creeping User Requirements

A.     New requirements or significant modifications to existing requirements that are made after a basic set of requirements have been mutually agreed to

B.     Widespread failure to anticipate changing requirements, with no plans for how to deal with them

·      Associated with Friction with Users, and sometimes with Friction with Senior Management

·      Causative factors of Missed Schedules, Excessive Time to Market, and Cost Overruns

·      Contributing factor to Excessive Schedule Pressure and Low Staff Morale

·      Creeping requirements can be caused by Inexperienced Users, Inexperienced Management, Inadequate Methodologies, Inadequate Cost Estimating and Inadequate Measurement

Excessive Schedule Pressure

A.     Coercive demands by software clients to deliver software applications in a shorter time period than is technically achievable

B.     Coercive demands by software executives or project managers to deliver code, specifications or documentation in a shorter time period than is technically possible

·      Significant contributor to Low Staff Morale and High Staff Turnover

·      Observed on a majority of Cancelled Projects and those with Cost Overruns

·      Main contributor to Low Quality

·      Excessive schedule pressure can be caused by Creeping User Requirements, Inadequate Estimating, Inadequate Measurement, Inadequate Planning and Management Malpractice

Inaccurate Cost Estimating

A.     Automated estimating methods that vary by >30% when calibrated against fully-measured control projects

B.     Automated partial estimating methods that omit, ignore or fail to include >30% of the activities and tasks associated with software projects unless specifically limited to selected activities

C.    All forms of manual estimating over 1000 Function Points

·      Associated with Cost Overruns, Long Schedules, Missed Schedules, Excessive Time to Market, Lost Business, Friction with Senior Management, Friction with Users, Inaccurate Quality Estimates, Inaccurate Reliability Estimates, Low Quality and  Cancelled Projects

·      Inaccurate cost estimates can be caused by Corporate Politics, Creeping Requirements, Inadequate Measurement, Inadequate Software Management Curricula, Inadequate Software Engineering Curricula, Inexperienced Management, Lag Time in Technology Adoption, Inaccurate Metrics, Poor Support Structures and Poor Technology Transfer

Inaccurate Metrics

A.     Common software metrics that violate standard economic assumptions

B.     Common software metrics that behave in paradoxical, counterintuitive or unpredictable ways

C.    “SLOC” and “KLOC” metrics when used as general-purpose software quality or productivity metrics

D.    “Cost per defect” when used as an indicator of quality costs

E.     “Software Science” metrics when used as general productivity or quality indicators

F.     Ratios and percentages when used as general productivity indicators

·      Associated with Poor Technology Investment, False Productivity Claims, Inadequate Cost Estimating and Inadequate Measurements

·      Causative factors to Missed Schedules, Long Schedules, Low Productivity and Cancelled Projects

·      Contributing factors to Friction with Executives, Friction with Users, Friction with Contractors and Low Management Morale

·      Characteristic (C) is associated with Poor Technology Investments, False Productivity Claims, Low Productivity, Inadequate Cost Estimating and Inadequate Measurements

·      Characteristic (D) is associated with Poor Technology Investments, Low Quality and Inadequate Defect Removal

·      Inaccurate metrics can be caused by Academic Malpractice, Management Malpractice, Inadequate Management Curricula and Inadequate Standards

Inadequate Measurement

A.     Failure to record the basic and special factors that influence software projects, coupled with either inaccurate or missing quantitative data on size, staffing, schedules, resources, costs and quality, also coupled with the use of paradoxical or unsound metrics

·      Root cause of Low Productivity, False Productivity Claims, Low Quality, Long Schedules, Missed Schedules, Excessive Time to Market, Inadequate Estimating, Friction with Senior Management, Friction with Users, Low User Satisfaction, Canceled Projects, Inadequate Methodologies, Inadequate Tools, Poor Organization Structures, Inadequate Specialization, Inadequate Capital Investment and Inadequate Office Environments

·      Inadequate measurements can be caused by Inadequate Software Management Curricula, Inadequate Software Engineering Curricula, Inexperienced Management, Lag Time in Technology Adoption, Inaccurate Metrics, Poor Organization Structures, Poor Technology Transfer and Poor Corporate Culture

Low Productivity

A.     Software projects that are significantly below U.S. industry averages for their class, type and size

B.     Any project that averages less than five Function Points per person month in net project productivity (the “current” U.S. average – Note that this is the U.S average as of the 1994 publication date of Caper Jones’ book)

C.    Any project perceived as being of low productivity by its clients or by senior management

·      Basic contributor to Friction with Users and Friction with Senior Management

·      Causative factor to False Productivity Claims

·      May sometimes be a factor leading to Canceled Projects and Excessive Time to Market

·      Low productivity can be caused by Low Levels of Reusability, Inexperienced Management, Inexperienced Staff, Inadequate Capital Investment, Inadequate Office Environments, Inadequate Methodologies, Inadequate Tools, Inadequate Measurements, Inadequate Metrics and Short-Range Improvement Planning

Low Quality

A.     Software where significant numbers of users are dissatisfied with quality and/or software receiving more than 0.25 user defect reports per Function Point per year

·      Key contributor to Low User Satisfaction and Friction with Users

·      Contributing factor to Low Market Shares and Excessive Time to Market

·      Causative factor to Friction with Senior Management, Low Staff Morale, Error-Prone Modules and  High Maintenance Costs

·      Often associated with Low Productivity and Long Schedules

·      Low quality can be caused by Inexperienced Management, Inexperienced Staff, Creeping User Requirements, Inadequate Estimating, Inadequate Planning, Inadequate Defect Removal, Inadequate Measurements and Excessive Schedule Pressure

Malpractice (Project Management)

A.     Performing managerial functions so poorly that harm/damage occurs to projects which are under the manager’s scope of authority

B.     Failure to exert proper authority to prevent harm/damage to projects which are under the manager’s scope of authority

C.    Repeated/significant errors (more than 35%) in performance of basic software management tasks of schedule planning and cost estimating

D.    Repeated delivery of software packages with excessive defect levels

E.     Failure to keep adequate measurement records of projects produced under their authority

·      Significant contributor to High Staff Attrition Rate and Low Staff Morale

·      Strongly associated with Canceled Projects, Corporate Politics, Cost Overruns, Excessive Schedule Pressure, Excessive Time to Market, Friction with Users, Long Schedules, Low Quality, Missed Schedules, Technical Malpractice and Silver Bullet Syndrome

·      Management malpractice can be caused by Inadequate Management Training, Inadequate Career Planning, Excessive Schedule Pressure, Executive Malpractice, Resistance to Change and Creeping User Requirements

·      May be caused by Inadequate Compensation Plans

Silver Bullet Syndrome

A.     The concept that a single tool or methodology will be the “silver bullet” that cures software productivity or quality problems

·      Significant contributor to Friction with Users and Friction with Senior Management

·      Causative factor for Canceled Projects, Excessive Time to Market, Long Schedules and Cost Overruns

·      Contributes to High Staff Attrition, Low Staff Morale, Low Productivity, Low Quality and Short-Range Improvement Planning

 

 

Table 3 is derived from the Guidelines for Successful Acquisition and Management of Software-Intensive Systems (GSAM)”, Version 3.0 [GSAM, 2000].  It is included here due to its more direct focus on the software acquisition process, and is noteworthy for its focus on the technical aspects of a project, rather than being limited to cost, schedule and organizational risks.

 

Table 3:  Significant Acquisition Risks to Address in the Acquisition Strategy [GSAM, 2000]

Risk Area

Significant Acquisition Program Risks

Threat

·       Uncertainty in threat accuracy and stability

·       Sensitivity of design & technology to threat

·       Vulnerability of system to threat countermeasures

·       Vulnerability of program to intelligence penetration

Requirements

·       Operational requirements not properly established or vaguely stated for program phase

·       Requirements are not stable

·       Required operating environment not described

·       Requirements do not address logistics and suitability

·       Requirements are too constrictive – identify specific solutions that force high cost

Design

·       Design implications not sufficiently considered in concept exploration

·       System will not satisfy user requirements

·       Mismatch of user manpower or skill profiles with system design solution or human-machine interface problems

·       Increased user skills or more training requirements identified late in the acquisition process

·       Design not cost effective

·       Design relies on immature technologies or excessive use of COTS to achieve performance objectives

Test & Evaluation

·       Test planning not initiated early in program

·       Testing does not address the ultimate operating environment

·       Test procedures do not address all major performance and suitability specifications

·       Test facilities not available to accomplish specific tests, especially system-level tests

·       Insufficient time to test thoroughly

Modeling & Simulation

·       Same risks as those identified for Test & Evaluation (T&E)

·       Modeling & Simulation (M&S) not verified, validated or accredited for the intended purpose

Technology

·       Program depends on unproven technology for success, or there are no alternatives

·       Program success depends on achieving advances in state-of-the-art technology

·       Potential advances in technology will result in less-than-optimal cost-effective system, or make system components obsolete

·       Technology has not been demonstrated in the required operating environment

·       Technology relies on complex hardware, software or integration design

·       Program lacks proper tools and M&S capability to assess alternatives

Logistics

·       Inadequate supportability late in development or after fielding, resulting in need for engineering changes, increased costs, and/or schedule delays

·       Life-cycle costs not accurate because of poor logistics supportability analysis (LSA)

·       LSA results not included in cost-performance trade-offs

·       Design trade studies do not include supportability considerations

Development

·       Development implications not considered during concept exploration

·       Development not sufficiently considered during design

·       Inadequate planning for long-lead items and vendor support

·       Development processes not proven

·       Prime contractors do not have adequate plans for controlling subcontractors

·       Sufficient development tools not readily available for cost-effective production

·       Contract offers no incentive to upgrade tools, improve processes, or reduce costs

Concurrency

·       Immature or unproven technologies will not be adequately developed prior to system production

·       Development funding will be available too early, i.e., before the development effort has sufficiently matured

·       Concurrency established without clear understanding of risks

Developer Capability

·       Developer has limited experience in specific type of development

·       Contractor has poor track record relative to costs and schedule

·       Contractor experiences loss of key personnel

·       Prime contractor relies heavily on subcontractors or Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) items for major development efforts

·       Contractor will require significant capitalization to meet program requirements

Cost/Funding

·       Realistic cost objectives not established early

·       Marginal performance capabilities incorporated at excessive costs; satisfactory cost-performance tradeoffs not done

·       Excessive life-cycle costs due to inadequate treatment of support requirements

·       Significant reliance on software

·       Funding profile does not match acquisition strategy

·       Funding profile not stable from budget cycle to budget cycle

Schedule

·       Schedule not considered in tradeoff studies

·       Schedule does not reflect realistic acquisition planning

·       Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) schedule objectives not realistic and obtainable

·       Resources not available to meet schedule

Management

·       Acquisition strategy does not give adequate consideration to various essential elements, e.g., mission need, test and evaluation, technology, etc.

·       Subordinate strategies and plans are not developed in a timely manner or based on the acquisition strategy

·       Proper mix (experience, skills, stability) of people not assigned to Program Management Office (PMO) or to Contractor team

·       Effective risk assessments not performed or results not understood and acted upon

 

 

Table 4, although it reverts back to the more “traditional” high-level risk concerns of cost, schedule and organization, is useful because it includes information related to symptoms, potential root causes of the risk, quantitative leading indicators that the risk has manifested, and generic mitigation techniques to address the risk.

 

Table 4:  Standard Risks for Project Failure [STSC, 2003]

Risk

Symptom

Root

Cause